Introduction
1990s financial crises led economists to rethink completely their approach toward monetary and banking crises (see the survey by Cartapanis, 2002) . The International Monetary Funds (IMF, 1998) emphasized that between 1985 and 1995, more than 130 of its members experienced serious banking problems.
The 1980s financial markets liberalization in emerging countries is generally blamed as a significant source of instability (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995; Griffith-Jones, 1998; Scialom, 2004) . Therefore, inefficiency may be consequently one of the major causes of 1990s banking problems, and should be a concern for policy makers (Resti, 1997) . Indeed, inefficiency can be regarded as socially beneficial as it reduces the cost of financial intermediation for consumers (Matthews and Tripe, 2004) . Thus greater amount, at better price and quality, are intermediated from savers to producers, enhancing investment and offering greater safety and returns for shareholders .
The purpose of this paper is therefore to asses whether a banking crisis can improve banking sector's efficiency? Our point comes from business cycles theory, where a crisis is the turning point from which the market/economy is recovering. In that spirit, if inefficiency plays a role in the occurrence of banking problems, the post-crisis period should be the time of recovering, as bad banks should have been taken over the market. Consequently, we also investigate the idea that efficiency should increase during the period following the crisis. To test this hypothesis, we look at the 1994 Turkish and 1997 Indonesian crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II defines both concepts of banking crisis and efficiency, and asses the interaction between the two in the cases of Indonesia and Turkey. Section III presents the sample and the econometric methodology. Section IV describes and analyzes the results.
Section V concludes and offers some policy recommendations. 
The role of efficiency in banking crises

Banking crises
While each banking crisis has its own dynamics, most of the main components remain identical. These common causes have been pointed out by Calomiris and Gorton (1991) , and for the special case of emerging economies by Goldstein and Turner (1996) (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995; Griffith-Jones, 1998; Scialom, 2004) .
Building on these elements, banking crises can be divided into two categories: microeconomic and macroeconomic. Our study focuses on the microeconomic level so the macro level will only be shortly presented, before turning to our point.
The macroeconomic level refers to a bad operating environment. Banking crises can arise from macroeconomic problems, the latter being external to the banking system. Even well-run banking systems operating in a strong legal and regulatory framework can be hit by an unstable macroeconomic environment.
The literature revealed a lot of macro problems that can be sources of banking crisis: lending booms, possibly fuelled by excessive capital inflows or changes in tax rules, real estate and/or equity price bubbles, business downturns, growing excess capacity/falling profitability in real sector, rising fiscal and/or 4 current account deficits, weakened public debt sustainability, sharp changes in exchange rates and real interest rates, etc.
The microeconomic level refers to bad banking. Banking crises are often linked to weak bank operations: poor lending practices, excessive risk taking, deficient governance, lack of internal controls, focus on market share rather than profitability, and currency and maturity mismatches in the banks themselves or among their borrowers. In some emerging countries, these conditions may be worsened when bank ownership is very narrow. In these circumstances, bad banking refers mostly to bad lending, connected lending, insider operations, and outright fraud may go hand in hand with impunity.
Similarly, state banks may be run as quasi-fiscal agencies based on political criteria with disregard for commercial principles, undermining their solvency and the soundness of other better-run banks. Bad banking can only persist in the absence of proper regulation and supervision, and of adequate market discipline. Supervisors may also lack authority and the sufficient skilled staff.
Expectation of depositors and creditors bailouts is also a well-known source of moral hazard problems that distort incentives, and thus efficiency.
Finally, the distinction between macro-and micro-founded banking crisis can be sometime uneasy. Financial liberalization can be classified in both categories as it influences banks managers and government behaviour and interact between them. In other words, government liberalise banking markets without adapting the legal framework (macro), inducing a distortion of banks' owners and managers incentives (micro).
Banks efficiency should be a serious concern for policy makers. First because the banking industry "has been obsessed with efficiency over the last decade" (Klinkerman, 2003) . Second because banking crises can be very costly (table 1) , depending mostly on the way public authorities manage it.
Conventional academic wisdom acknowledges that a banking authority with a strong budget constraint will solve a banking crisis more quickly than a soft 5 budget constrained authority 3 . It has been theoretically shown that a soft budget constraint induces no discrimination between 'good-efficient' and 'badinefficient' banks when bailing out the sector. At the opposite, a strong budget constraint induces that the authority to close the banks. Therefore, recovering time will vary in this respect. An interesting and surprising result can be found in the IMF 1998's World Economic Outlook: emerging economies are more likely to be affected by banking problems than industrialised ones, but the average recovering delay is greater in industrialised countries (table 2) . 
Efficiency
Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) summarise conceptual and measurement problems induced by the concept of operating efficiency inspired by the work of Farrell (1957) which defines it as cost minimising and profit maximising production process. Economic efficiency arises from technical and allocative efficiency. The former refers to an over-utilisation of some inputs and the latter refers to a bad combination of inputs comparing to their relative prices.
Addressing this problem in emerging markets allows us to refer to the concept of efficiency as typically in these economies, credit is overproduced and personal, capital and funds are badly used to produce it for the reasons listed before.
The way we asses efficiency is generally represented by some form of parametric and non-parametric frontiers. Firms' efficiency is then defined in terms of their relative distance from the efficient frontier which becomes therefore the benchmark for optimum performance. Many comprehensive studies raised important problematic regarding banks operations. Banking efficiency literature in the United States, European Countries and also Eastern 3 For a stylised model, see Huang and Xu (2000) .
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European Countries provided a substantial number of studies with different methodologies. Some researches dealing with efficiency in US Banking found that banks could cut their cost and improve their profit efficiency more by reducing frontier inefficiencies rather than by reducing some optimal level of scale and scope economies to minimize average cost and profit efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1991 , Berger and Mester, 1997 . Still working on US banks, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found that foreign banks are relatively less efficient than domestic banks. Other studies, like Turati (2001) , noted that the higher the cost efficiency, the higher the level of profits a bank will earn. He did not found, over 250 European commercial banks from 1992 to 1999, any striking difference in average efficiency among European countries. Sheldon (1999) used unconsolidated data for 1,783 commercial and savings banks in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland for the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] and finds that larger banks, specialized banks and retail banks are more cost and profit efficient than small banks, diversified banks and wholesale banks, respectively. Using Turkish banks, Jackson et al. (1998) found that competition among banks is important for the banking performance and efficiency. Relying on these results, some authors assumed that banks across different countries access equally to the same banking technology. Others concluded that efficiency results can not be compared across borders because each country has specific features, such as regulatory powers, demography, and economic conditions (Bos & Schimiedel, 2003) .
All these studies raised concerns about important features of the production process and economic problematic, but few have investigated the implication of inefficiency on banking crises.
Banking crises in Indonesia and Turkey
Both Turkish and Indonesian States were strongly involved in the financial sector management, until the end of the 70s for Turkey and the 80s for -
The liberalization process led both countries to some structural weaknesses listed below.
Insufficient capitalisation
Stockholders' equity remained low because law made it possible to open a bank with little funds, from approximately US$ 30 millions for Turkey. In Indonesia, the deregulation of October 1988, made possible to create a new bank with even lower capital (only 10 milliard Rupiah, i.e. around US$ 4 millions).
Moreover, taxes and chronic hyperinflation in those countries did not 8 encourage banks-owners to increase their own capital stocks. Figure 2 highlights the weakness of owned capital stocks in both Turkish and Indonesian systems.
Degradation of credits quality
The credits quality decreased because of illegal appropriations, concentration of risks and insufficient provisions. Figure 3 emphasises banking assets weakness. The bad credits quality is even more obvious when considering the ratio of unproductive loans. To offset their losses, banks artificially increased the value of their underperforming assets (by making calculation with bookand not market-values for example), in order to meet prudential ratios.
Figure 3: Permanent assets (PA)/Total assets and Non-performing loans (NPL)/Total loans --------------------------------------
A large exposure -
Figure 4: Liquid assets/Total assets (%)
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Figure 5: Interests expenses/Non-interests expenses (%)
In terms of returns over equity (RoE) and over assets (RoA), Turkish banks look less more profitable than foreign banks. In Indonesia, state-owned banks were very unprofitable and even private-and foreign-owned banks seem to 9 have suffered during the second half of the 1990s. Table 3 shows all the details.
On the overall, state-owned banks are less profitable, which is not surprising. Table 4 shows the fragmentation of banking sector structure for both countries. 
Inadequate supervision
Banking sectors are characterized by both an internal and external inadequate supervision, due mainly to the lack of transparency. The Turkish banks used to window-dress their balance sheets, either using accountancy tricks in overestimating the value of the permanent credits compared to their market prices, or quite simply by playing with the inflation and exchange rates.
In Indonesia, the lack of supervision trained a sharp increase of underperforming credits. The economic crisis showed that banks were vulnerable mainly because of high NPLs. Because of inadequate supervision, only little banks declared their real NPL positions, especially because of the lack of legal sanctions from monetary authorities.
On the overall, both banking sectors were dominated by the States. The liberalizations have weakened banking industries, worsening bad banking 10 behaviours. Thus, coming to our hypothesis, we expect an increase of inefficiency before and a decrease after the crisis. 
Methodology
There are five ways to asses efficiency; two non-parametric approaches: data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH); and three parametric estimation methods: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), free distribution analysis (DFA) and thick frontier analysis (TFA).
We build a translogarythmic cost function to estimate a stochastic cost frontier (SFA) for each of our panel using log-Likelihood estimation. The use of a cost instead of a production function is due to the assumption that banks in Indonesia and Turkey were strictly following profit maximization strategies, which can not be robustly satisfied during the sample period. Moreover, because of Governments' soft budgets constraints, outputs levels could have been exogenously driven. These assumptions lead us to reject a production approach. A cost function was preferred under the assumptions of exogenous output and input prices. The competitiveness of banking industry for both countries suggests that banks competed for their input price and not only on output side. Finally, a cost function allows us to consider more than a unique output. We introduce the inputs/outputs choice in the next section.
Largely used in related literature, the translog cost function surpasses other functions (like Cobb-Douglas, CES, Leontieff, etc.) thanks to its flexible form.
The use of the SFA method is mainly motivated by the fact that nonparametric approaches do not consider noise in the estimation. The fact that we are actually looking at emerging economies means a more unstable economic environment and idiosyncratic shocks can not be omitted.
Moreover, it has been shown that SFA method is more robust for bigger samples (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998 6 These results are available upon request to the authors.
13 Table 5 introduces the variables used. Table 6 shows the repartition of banks inside the different panels, showing that the Indonesian and the Turkish banking sector are similarly built, strengthening the relevance of these countries for our study. Table 6 : Description of variables
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The total cost ( is the sum of interest and non interest expenses. There are two outputs : representing the total credits of the type of banks i, and regrouping all the others productive assets (the essential part is made of cash and securities). There are three input prices ( ): is the price of labour, measured by the ratio of total salaries and employee benefit expenses to total assets (since the information with respect to the number of employees is almost completely lacking for most Indonesian banks, we are not able to compute the personnel expenses per employees, alternatively, the personnel expenses as a fraction of total assets is used); is the price of physical capital, measured by the ratio of total non interest expenses minus total salaries and employee benefit expenses over total fixed assets; and finally, is the price of borrowed funds, measured as the total interest expenses over total fund borrowed, mainly made of deposits (demand and term) and trading account securities.
Debate about what constitutes the outputs and inputs in a banking firm is still ongoing. In this paper, the intermediation approach is adopted. The bank uses labour, physical capital and borrowed funds to produce earning assets (see Sealey and Lindley, 1997) . This is the most commonly used approach in the bank cost function literature. It is also argued that deposits are an input to the 14 production of loans, or alternatively, that they are considered as an output because they involved the creation of added value (Berger, Handcock and Humprey, 1993) . We decide to use them as an input referring to conventional accountancy principles 7 that put them on the liability side.
Results and interpretation
We focus our work on the variation of the estimated parameters before and after the crisis. To support this choice, we run a Chow-type likelihood-ratio test (results are reported in table 7) pooling together both samples before and after the crisis and comparing them. Both results are positive and enforce thus our estimations. This will help us to estimate the influence of a banking crisis on banks' efficiency. We presume that during a banking crisis, 'bad banks'
should be eliminated, leading therefore to an increase in efficiency.
- Table 7 : LR-tests for both countries Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the estimated parameters. On the overall, parameters are reasonably consistent with expectations. In most cases, the specifications of the factors (inputs and outputs) turned to be statistically significant for all groups (state, private and foreign banks) and panels (before and after the banking crisis).
-------------------------------------
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Our interpretations focus on table 8 that shows the it µ for all specifications. On the whole, the expected positive effects of crises on each country's global banking sector are unexpected. For all sub-samples, i.e. for all type of ownership, and for both countries, the inefficiency is not decreasing after the crisis, and more surprisingly, it seems to increase in most of the cases.
Looking at the models, small samples and in particular the sub-samples B (i.e. before the crises) fit poorly and did not allow us to compare before and after the crisis results. However, results for the sector and for private (both domestic and foreign owned) banks allows the comparison. Thus we are able to distinguish from the sub-sample B if the sectors' inefficiency is driven by private-domestic-foreign or state-owned banks. Not surprisingly, overall inefficiency is driven by state-owned banks. 9 For both countries, privatedomestic banks are more inefficient than private-foreign owned banks. This result in also in contradiction with the literature that call for a Foreign-OwnedBank Barriers Hypothesis that did not seems to apply to both countries (see Berger, De Young, Genay and Udell, 2000 , for a review of this hypothesis).
This can be explained by the fact that this hypothesis applies for developing countries. The focus on emerging economies can explain our results, meaning that foreign banks are well run and beneficiate from know-how and from high skilled and experienced personnel, leading thus to more efficient work. 
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Lastly, looking at the size effect, table 9 shows an interesting pattern. If large banks seem to be more inefficient on the overall (inefficiency scores are higher for large banks in both countries), the crisis affects countries differently.
Turkish large banks' inefficiency decreases after the crisis and small banks' inefficiency increases after the crisis. In other words, it means that even if large banks are less efficient, small ones are not better of after the crisis. For Indonesia, results are reversed. Inefficiency is slightly increasing for large banks after the crisis, and strongly decreasing for small banks. This can be explained by the fact that policy responses by Indonesian and Turkish authorities were different and this may have impact banks differently.
9 Note that for sub-sample B of state-owned Indonesia banks, the estimation reveals a negative µ, meaning that the model does not fit for this sub-sample. On the overall, the model fits better Turkish banking industry. This may be imputable to the recapitalisation and restructuring process, and thus can lead to misinterpretation of the function 
Summary and policy recommendations
This study investigates the cost structure of Indonesian and Turkish banking industries using a translog cost function to build a stochastic frontier before and after the respective banking crises.
Concerning Turkey, our results are consistent with the findings of Yeldan (2001), the Banks Association of Turkey (2000) The Indonesian banking sector is also less efficient in the post-crisis period, which is also consistent with Levin (1996) and McFadden (1994) Our major insight is that inefficiency did not decrease significantly after the crisis; conversely, it increases after the crisis. To support this conclusion, the
International Monetary Funds has published, in 1998's World Economic
Outlook, a survey showing that Emerging Markets need on average 2.8 years to recover -in terms of output growth -from a banking crisis. For Turkey, the post-crisis period asked 6 years. For Indonesia, the period after the crisis takes only 4 years. This leads us to recommend prudence for Indonesia's banking sector. If it has not dealt with its inefficiency problems, the sector can be vulnerable to another banking crisis. 
Source : TBB (Turkey) and Ecofin and Indonesian Banking Directory (Indonesia)
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Figure 1: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) --------------------------------------
